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I. INTRODUCTION
The elusive Roadrunner flashes past Wile E. Coyote as Coyote
ceaselessly pursues the bird, undaunted by Roadrunner's trademark
"Beep! Beep!" In one episode of the cartoon featuring the two
characters, Coyote convinces Roadrunner to reverse course, back
through a long pipe. At long last, it appears, Coyote will catch
Roadrunner. When Roadrunner emerges from the pipe, though, it is a
giant incarnation of itself, dwarfing Coyote in size. Staring at the
audience in frustration, Coyote holds up two signs: "Okay, wise guys,-
you always wanted me to catch him-"; "Now what do I do?"'
Coyote and Roadrunner first appeared in 1949, long before the
"beeping" of today's technology. The phenomenon of endless pursuit to
control that which continues to evolve and elude capture, however,
renders these characters a compelling metaphor to describe the legal
profession's ongoing attempts to revise its professional code of conduct
to incorporate technological and cultural changes.
* Jan L. Jacobowitz is a Lecturer in Law and the Director of the Professional
Responsibility and Ethics Program at the University of Miami School of Law. Gayland 0.
Hethcoat II is a 2011 graduate of the University of Miami School of Law.
1. Rommelbacsi, Coyote Catches Road Runner, YOUTUBE (June 11, 2006), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v-KJJW7EF5aVk.
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The law sometimes compels society forward and at other times lags
behind a rapidly changing aspect of society. The Internet, for example,
has revolutionized communication and created a global community,
impacting international relations, commerce, education, and politics-
generally every sphere. The law, no less, has tried to "catch up" with
these changes. Copyright and privacy are just a couple of areas that are
morphing to adjust to a different set of circumstances.
The legal profession itself is no exception. Technology and
globalization have fueled the long-running debate whether the practice
of law is a profession or business. Laurel Terry's astute observations as
to the inception of the term "service providers" as applied to lawyers in
international agreements, and Christopher Whelan's description of the
revamping of England's approach to the legal profession in the Legal
Services Act lend credence to the argument that the practice of law has
become, at a minimum, a business that maintains aspirational goals.2
Regardless of whether a "winner" may be declared in the profession-
versus-business debate, legal advertising indisputably has grown with
the advent of firm websites and social media. Since 1977, when the U.S.
Supreme Court deemed attorney advertising constitutionally protected
commercial speech in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,3 the American Bar
Association (ABA) and its state counterparts have debated and enacted
various regulations of attorney advertising.4 The tension between the
First Amendment's protection of advertising for the "business" of law
and the view of advertising as demeaning to the "profession" of law and
exploitive of the public often has driven the regulatory process.s
This tension has heightened since the days when most advertising
appeared in the Yellow Pages, on benches and billboards, or on the
more costly media of radio and television. Now, the Internet and social
media provide virtually unlimited avenues for low-cost, far-reaching
advertising. The 2010 ABA Legal Technology Survey found that
approximately 87% of attorneys in the United States have a website,
and 56% of attorneys in private practice have a presence on an online
social network as compared to 15% in 2008.6 The general user statistics
2. See Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of
Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers," 2008 PROF. LAW 189 (2008); Christopher
J. Whelan, The Paradox ofProfessionalism: Global Law Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REv. 465 (2008).
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. See, e.g., R. Michael Hoefges, Regulating Professional Services Advertising: Current
Constitutional Parameters and Issues Under the First Amendment Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 24 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 953 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Rodney A Smolla, Lawyer Advertising and the Dignity of the Profession, 59
ARK. L. REv. 437 (2006).
6. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Legal Technology Survey Results Released
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.abanow.org/2010/09/aba-legal-technology-survey-results-releas
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reported by social-networking sites are perhaps more compelling:
Facebook claims more than 400 million users; LinkedIn, more than 65
million users; and Twitter, more than 105 million users.7 As these
figures suggest, a state bar association attempting to stay abreast of
technology to regulate attorneys in its jurisdiction is much like Coyote
in pursuit of Roadrunner: Even if the bar association corrals the current
technology, the technology is always changing and therefore eluding
ultimate capture. The regulators are left to ponder Coyote's query:
"Now what do I do?"
This Article focuses on the Florida Bar's attempt to wrestle with this
question in regulating attorney advertising. Among state bars, the
Florida Bar has been a pioneer in regulating advertising, especially with
respect to new technology. The Bar's efforts have been years in the
making, but only until recently did constitutional considerations
percolate to the forefront as the Bar faced litigation threats, and federal
courts issued opinions expounding on attorneys' First Amendment
rights.8 With the release of a proposed new code of advertising rules
that is sure to draw the attention of other bars across the country,
moreover, questions have arisen anew as to whether the Bar has drafted
rules that will prove relevant and effective in vindicating the public
interest while simultaneously respecting attorneys' constitutional rights.
This Article offers an early analysis of the proposed rules and
submits that, although they are an improvement over the current rules,
they still retain features that attorneys are bound to attack in testing the
rules' constitutionality under the First Amendment commercial speech
and void-for-vagueness doctrines. This conclusion follows from an
overview of the Bar's protracted decisions to regulate, deregulate, and
reregulate attorney advertising, particularly on the Internet, and a
summary of recent federal court cases that call into question some of the
Bar rules in both their current and proposed forms.
Even if the proposed rules become law and overcome legal
challenge, the process by which the Bar enacted them is one that other
bars may want to learn from and avoid. Bureaucratic obfuscation and
paternalism have been staple features of this process and at the cost of
certainty, time, and resources. A better approach to follow is one where
constitutional principles play a prominent role early on in regulators'
efforts to respond to the public policy challenges that accompany new
ed/.
7. Dustin B. Benham, The State Bar of Texas Provides New Guidance to Attorneys
Regarding the Proper Use of Social Media and Blogs for Advertising Purposes, 52 ADVOCATE
(Tex.) 13, 14 (2010) (citations omitted).
8. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legalzoom Have First Amendment Rights?:
Some Thoughts About Freedom ofSpeech and the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, 20 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REV. 255 (2011).
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innovations in society.
II. FLORIDA: A CASE STUDY IN ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING REGULATION
Florida is a terrific case study of a state bar's striving to navigate the
tension between the First Amendment's protection of attorneys'
freedom of speech and the legal profession's desire to regulate attorney
advertising. A close look at the history of regulation in the state reveals
that as Florida has exceeded many other states in the extent to which it
has addressed attorney advertising, it has invited major constitutional
challenge.
After the Bates decision in 1980, the Florida Bar amended its
advertising rules to allow advertising in accordance with the Supreme
Court's opinion to prohibit fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading
advertising.9 Because computers and the Internet were not yet
considerations, the Bar premised its rules on traditional media, such as
newspapers, television, and radio.' 0 The Florida Board of Governors
voted in 1985 to maintain its regulatory jurisdiction over advertising,
and the Bar continued to study and amend its advertising rules
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.II
Fast forward to 1999. That year, the Florida Supreme Court adopted
rule 4-7.6, governing "computer accessed-communications," to
acknowledge and regulate Internet advertising.12 Rule 4-7.6 provides
that an attorney has to provide some basic information about office
location and licensure, but generally deems a website "information upon
request."' 3 The comment to the rule elaborates:
The specific regulations that govern computer-accessed
communications differ according to the particular variety of
communication employed. For example, a lawyer's Internet web
site is accessed by the viewer upon the viewer's initiative and,
accordingly, the standards governing such communications
correspond to the rules applicable to information provided to a
9. Fla. Bar Amendment to Fla. Bar Code of Prof. Responsibility (Adver.), 380 So. 2d
435, 436-37 (Fla. 1980).
10. Id. at 437-38.
11. See, e.g., Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the R. Regulating the Fla. Bar-Adver. Issues,
571 So. 2d451 (Fla. 1990).
12. Amendments to R. Regulating the Fla. Bar-Adver. Rules, 762 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
1999) [hereinafter Amendments].
13. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-7.6(b)(3) (2009).
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prospective client at the prospective client's request.' 4
When the Supreme Court adopted rule 4-7.6 in 1999, the rule was
understood by reference to then rule 4-7.9, which defined information
upon request as information subject to the general advertising rules with
the exception of the prohibitions of statements characterizing the quality
of legal services and referring to past results.' 5
As the use of new technology proliferated, the Bar petitioned the
Supreme Court in 2005 to delete rule 4-7.9 and exempt "information
upon request" from the advertising rules by amendment of rule 4-7.1 .16
The court adopted that proposal and declined to address rule 4-7.6
because the Bar informed the court that a committee was studying
proposals for future website regulation. 17 As a result of the deregulation
of "information upon request," websites were no longer subject to the
general advertising rules; an attorney remained bound only to the
specific provisions of rule 4-7.6 and the general prohibition of
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in rule 4-8.4.18
Consequently, websites could presumably contain testimonials and
references to past results on the theory that the attorney was not
reaching out to the client, but rather the client was seeking and
requesting the information.
This result, however, became the flashpoint for an ongoing debate
over website regulation that could be seen as a battle between the
economic realities of practicing law in the digital age and an
overarching concern about protecting the public. Discussion about the
Bates case and the First Amendment seemed to slip into the background
as law firms expanded their websites, and concern about the impact on
the public grew. One of the parties to the debate was the Florida Bar
Advertising2 Task Force, established in 2004 to investigate website
advertising. 0 The Task Force deemed websites to be "information upon
request" because individuals had to actively search for the information,
unlike other advertising that one encounters passively when it appears
14. Id. cmt.
15. Amendments, 762 So. 2d at 425.
16. In re Amendments to the R. Regulating the Fla. Bar-Adver., 971 So. 2d 763, 763-64
(Fla. 2007).
17. Id at 764.
18. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-7.1(h)-(i), 4-8.4 (2010).
19. FLORIDA BAR, History of Website Regulation, www.Florida bar.org (type in search
box "History of Website Regulation") (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter History of Website
Regulation].
20. Mark D. Killian, Court Says Lawyer Web Sites Are Subject to the Advertising Rules,
FLA. B. NEWS (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www. floridabar.org (type in search box "Court says lawyer
web sites").
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in a mailbox or on a television screen.21 Thus, the Task Force
distinguished Internet advertising and concluded that it did not require
the same level of scrutiny. 22
The Board of Governors entered the debate and registered its
disagreement with the Task Force.23 The Board of Governors
analogized Internet advertising to the Yellow Pages to support its
position that the public would be best protected by regulation of
websites. 24 Because the interpretations of the Task Force and the Board
of Governors were diametrically opposed, the Bar established the
Special Committee on Website Advertising to gain further insight into
the regulatory issues at stake.25
In 2008, based upon the recommendation of the Special Committee,
the Bar filed a petition with the Supreme Court that offered a
compromise. 26 The Bar proposed that the homepage of an attorney's
website be governed by the advertising rules but that limited exceptions
exist for the rest of the website.27 Under these exceptions, statements
characterizing the quality of legal services, references to past results,
and testimonials would be permissible if truthful and, in regard to the
latter two exceptions, if accompanied by a disclaimer. 28 The court,
however, rejected the Bar's proposal in February of 2009.29 Rule 4-7.6
therefore, was unchanged; websites remained virtually unregulated.36
The Bar then filed a motion for clarification in which it emphasized that
the court's rejection of the Bar's proposal left websites subject to
minimal regulation.31
The court granted the Bar's motion for clarification and in
November of 2009 issued a revised opinion in which it held that
information on attorney websites would be governed by all the
advertising rules, including those prohibiting statements containing past
results, references to the quality of legal services, and testimonials. 32






26. History of Website Regulation, supra note 19.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. In re Amendments to the R. Regulating the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-7.6, Computer
Accessed Comm'ns, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S261 (Fla. 2007).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. In re Amendments to the R. Regulating the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-7.6, Computer
Accessed Comm'ns, 24 So. 3d 172, 172-73 (Fla. 2009).
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because they have the highest ability to mislead consumers.33 Moreover,
according to the court, these statements have the greatest potential for
"further denigrating the justice system and the legal profession in the
minds of the public." 34 The court saw no convincing rationale for
effectively loosening the rules for a medium that the Bar could not
adequately monitor or control.35
The flashpoint now gave birth to a firestorm. Only days before the
court issued its November 2009 opinion, the Bar reached a settlement
with attorney Joel Rothman, who sued to challenge on First Amendment
grounds the Bar's application of the advertising rules with respect to his
profile on avvo.com, a website that rates attorney services using client
testimonials. 6 The stipulation stated that the Bar:
will consider a lawyer's online profile to be a communication at
the prospective client's request under rule 4-7.1(f) if it appears on
a Web site that allows creation of public or private profiles as
part of a legal or business directory, or ratings site, and if the
lawyer's profile may be reached by searching for or selecting the
lawyer's name under circumstances where it is reasonably clear
that the user is accessing information about the lawyer. This
stipulation is not intended to cover information that would
otherwise be prohibited by rules if that information is
automatically displayed within the result of a general search
inquiry not designed to produce information about the particular
advertising lawyer.3 7
Rothman bemoaned his triumph as fleeting because the Supreme
Court's November 2009 opinion was to take effect on January 1,
2010.38 The court's opinion did not go into effect, however, because of
an initial moratorium on enforcement and then a stay. More study,
additional proposals, and considerable discussion and debate ensued.3
As these developments occurred, the economic stakes became
enormous. Many Florida law firms with websites would be in violation
of the court's November 2009 order if it became effective and
enforceable. In fact, eight large law firms that invested considerable
33. Id. at 174.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Gary Blankenship, Bar Will Not Apply Ad Rules to Web Rating Service Pending




39. History of Website Regulation, supra note 19.
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funds into their websites filed a sixty-page comment arguing, based
upon their First Amendment rights, against any amendments to the
rules that the Bar proposed to effectuate in the November 2009
opinion.40 The conflict between the economic impact of the court's
opinion and the state interest in protecting the public thus caused the
discussion to refocus on the First Amendment as the Bar proposed an
entirely revamped set of advertising rules. It now appears that perhaps
the Bar's efforts have concluded where they might have more properly
begun in 2005: with an analysis of the constitutional safeguards that
protect attorney advertising.
III. RECENT FEDERAL COURT CASES REGARDING
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
As pressures from the practicing bar have compelled the Florida Bar
to reevaluate the constitutionality of its advertising rules, cases in the
federal courts have further raised the stakes in regulatory reform. Two
federal circuit courts of appeals, the Second and Fifth Circuits, recently
revisited the First Amendment jurisprudence governing attorney
advertising and overturned several rules in New York and Louisiana
respectively, the latter of which drew heavily from the rules in Florida.4f
Meanwhile, following an opinion by the Eleventh Circuit that focused
largely on justiciability issues,42 a Florida district court held that a
number of the Florida Bar's advertising rules are unconstitutionally
vague and infringe attorneys' commercial speech rights.43
The Second and Fifth Circuit cases-Alexander v. Cahill44 and
Public Citizen v. Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board,45
respectively-are markedly similar in their holdings and rationales.
Among the various rules the courts analyzed, both courts invalidated
prohibitions of references to or testimonials about attorneys'
services46-advertising techniques that, as Joel Rothman's experience
demonstrates, have considerable potential in the new media landscape.
40. See Comment of Eight Law Firms, In re: Fla. Bar's Petition to Amend R. Regulating
the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-7.6, No. SC1O-1014 (Fla. filed Aug. 14, 2010) (Computer Accessed
Comm'ns).
41. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att'y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011);
Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 820 (2010).
42. See Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2010).
43. See Harrell v. Fla. Bar, No. 3:08-cv-15-J-34TEM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2011),
available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/dbr/Harrell_v_FloridaBar DistrictCourtOrderlO0
311.pdf.
44. 598 F.3d 79.
45. 632 F.3d 212.
46. Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 221-23; Alexander, 598 F.3d at 92.
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To this end, both courts applied the test which the Supreme Court
articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York to assess the constitutionality of a regulation
on commercial speech: 47
[The regulation] at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
* 48extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Rejecting arguments proffered by the regulatory bodies that
testimonials are "inherently misleading" and therefore not entitled to
any constitutional protection, both courts concluded that testimonials
could be protected commercial speech under Central Hudson.49 The
courts reasoned that testimonials could encompass verifiable facts,
which are protected by the First Amendment.50 As the Fifth Circuit
pointed out, "[a] statement that a lawyer has tried 50 cases to a verdict,
obtained a $1 million settlement, or procured a settlement for 90% of
his clients . . . are objective, verifiable facts," as opposed to "statements
such as 'he helped me,' 'I received a large settlement,' or 'I'm glad I
hired her' . . . ."si Consequently, because testimonials were only
"potentially misleading," 52 the courts held that they were due some
protection, which an outright ban did not afford.53
The Second and Fifth Circuits, furthermore, were skeptical toward
paternalism as an undercurrent of Louisiana's and New York's
respective rules. In its analysis of Louisiana's testimonial rule, the Fifth
Circuit explained that "[e]ven if, as [the Louisiana Attorney Discipline
Board] argues, the prohibited speech has the potential for fostering
unrealistic expectations in consumers, the First Amendment does not
tolerate speech restrictions that are based only on a 'fear that people
would make bad decisions if given truthful information."' 54 Ultimately,
the court reasoned, the First Amendment reflects a greater concern
47. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
48. Id. at 566.
49. Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 218-19; Alexander, 598 F.3d at 88-90-92.
50. Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 221-22; Alexander, 598 F.3d at 92.
51. Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 221.
52. Id. at 219.
53. Id. at 218-19; Alexander, 598 F.3d at 88-90, 95-96.
54. Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 222 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 359 (2002)).
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about suppression of information than poor decision-making.5 5
The Second Circuit expressed a similar rationale in scrutinizing a
New York rule that prohibited advertisements that relied on "irrelevant
techniques"-that is, "techniques to obtain attention that demonstrate a
clear and intentional lack of relevance to the selection of counsel,
including the portrayal of law ers exhibiting characteristics clearly
unrelated to legal competence."5 The court acknowledged that the rule
advanced "an interest in keeping attorney advertising factual and
relevant" but rejected this interest as sufficiently substantial under
Central Hudson. Further, the court distinguished this interest from "an
interest in preventing misleading advertising" and noted that no
evidence showed that the "irrelevant techniques" prohibited by the rule
were, in fact, "misleading and so subject to proscription. "59 The court
seemed to appreciate that as media has evolved, so too have notions of
what the legal profession is, or should be, in the public's view:
[T]he sorts of gimmicks that this rule appears designed to
reach-such as [the plaintiff-attorneys'] wisps of smoke, blue
electrical currents, and special effects-do not actually seem
likely to mislead. It is true that [the plaintiff-attorneys] are not
giants towering above local buildings; they cannot run to a
client's house so quickly that they appear as blurs; and they do
not actually provide legal assistance to space aliens. But given
the prevalence of these and other kinds of special effects in
advertising and entertainment, we cannot seriously believe-
purely as a matter of "common sense"-that ordinary individuals
are likely to be misled into thinking that these advertisements
depict true characteristics. Indeed, some of these gimmicks, while
seemingly irrelevant, may actually serve important
communicative functions: they attract the attention of the
audience to the advertiser's message, and they may also serve to
impart information directly.60
New York's "irrelevant techniques" rule was similar to a prefatory
Florida Bar rule at issue in Harrell v. Florida Bar.6 1 The latter rule, rule
4-7.1, disallows all advertisements except those that provide "only
55. Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
56. Alexander, 598 F.3d at 93 (quoting N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 1200.50(c)(5)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 94.
60. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)).
61. 608 F.3d 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2010).
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useful, factual information presented in a nonsensational manner." 62
Like the Second Circuit with respect to the New York rule, a district
court struck down the Florida rule, but on the ground that it was
impermissibly vague and chilled protected speech. Thus, the rule was
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 6 3
Notably missing among the numerous rules that the Harrell plaintiffs
contested, however, was rule 4-7.2, which prohibits advertisements that
"contain[] any reference to past successes or results obtained" and that
"contain[ ] a testimonial." 64 Nevertheless, it seems, if a litigant could
meet the standing and ripeness requirements that the Eleventh Circuit
discussed in an opinion that remanded the Harrell case to the district
court, 65 that litigant would have solid authority from sister circuits to
challenge these bans.
The foregoing developments have crystallized the need for state bars
to reconsider long-held assumptions about media and consumers as they
embark on overhauling their advertising rules to respond to new
technology. The threat of litigation over constitutionally questionable
rules is real: Public Citizen-a pro-consumer advocacy group that was a
party to all the above cases-has showed that it will file suit across the
country to object to overreaching regulations of attorney advertising.66
While the Florida Bar in particular has endeavored to construct a new,
comprehensive code of advertising rules, whether those rules
themselves could become the target of litigation depends on an
important question: Has the Bar given constitutional considerations
their due?
IV. AN EARLY ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA BAR'S
PROPOSED ADVERTISING RULES
The Florida Bar purported to answer that question in the affirmative
in its recent petition to amend its advertising rules, filed in the Florida
Supreme Court in July of 2011.67 The petition explains that the Bar
rewrote the rules after extensive study, input from bar members and the
public, public surveys, and a review of the U.S. Supreme Court's
62. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-7.1 cmt. (2010).
63. See Harrell v. Fla. Bar, No. 3:08-cvl5-J-34TEM, slip op. at 22-23 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
30, 2011), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/dbr/Harrell-v_FloridaBarDistrictCourt
Order1003 11.pdf.
64. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-7.2(c)(1)(F), (J) (2011).
65. See Harrell, 608 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2010).
66. See About Us, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2306 (last visited
Mar. 2, 2012).
67. See Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the R. Regulating the Fla. Bar-Subchapter 4-7,
Lawyer Adver. Rules (Fla. July 5, 2011).
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attorney advertising case law.68 The result of this information-gathering
process was a slate of rules that mark a major transformation of the
current rules. Designed with the goals to protect the public from "false,
misleading, or deceptive information by lawyers" and to provide the
legal community with "clear and simple guidelines," 69 the rules cluster
around principles from the Supreme Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence. The rules specifically create tiers of advertising that the
Bar prohibits, which include "deceptive and inherently misleading
advertisements" and "potentially misleading advertisements."'o The
rules also include examples of the advertising assigned to each tier.
Because the Bar was focused on "prohibiting only that which is
misleading or unduly intrusive or manipulative," the rules notably no
longer distinguish among advertising media.7 1 Perhaps more notably,
the Bar concedes that its current rules are "too restrictive under
constitutional law." 72 Channeling the rationale of the recent Second and
Fifth Circuit opinions, the Bar notes that the rules' ban on
advertisements that contain any references to past results or
testimonials, for example, appear to run afoul of the First Amendment's
protection of truthful commercial information.73
The question remains: Do the proposed rules constitutionally
suffice? At least facially, it seems that the rules are an improvement.
Recognizing that the First Amendment protects accurate statements of
facts, proposed rule 4-7.3 allows advertisements that contain references
to past results unless such information is not "objectively verifiable"
and also allows advertisements that contain testimonials that comply
with certain enumerated criteria. 74 On the other hand, this rule deems
advertisements with references to past results that are not objectively
verifiable "deceptive or inherentl5 misleading advertising" and
accordingly subject to proscription. This rule similarly disallows
"comparisons of lawyers or statements, words or phrases that
characterize a lawyer's or law firm's skills, experience, reputation or
68. Id. 12,4-5,7.
69. Bd. Review Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Report on the Lawyer Adver. Rules, Fla. Bar 1,
3-4 (May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Advertising Report].
70. See Fla. Bar News, Amendments to the Pending Lawyer Adver. Rules, at R. 4-7.3, 4-
7.4 (proposed draft 2011) (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Pending Adver. Rules].
71. Advertising Report, supra note 69, at 5; Pending Adver. Rules, supra note 70, at R. 4-
7.1(a) ("Unless otherwise indicated, this subchapter applies to all forms of communication in
any print or electronic forum . . . ."). The proposed rules do distinguish direct mail as a form of
solicitation. Advertising Report, supra note 69, at 5.
72. Advertising Report, supra note 69, at 5.
73. Id. at 6-7.
74. Pending Adver. Rules, supra note 70, at R. 4-7.3(b)(2), (8).
75. Id. R. 4.7.3(b)(2).
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record, unless such characterization is objectively verifiable."76
Additionally, it limits testimonials from qualified individuals (e.g.,
clients) to comments "on matters such as courtesy, promptness,
efficiency, and professional demeanor."77
In these instances, the Bar effectively proposes to prohibit or restrict
advertisements that address the quality of an attorney's legal services in
a way that cannot be factually substantiated. The proposed comments
try to illustrate. The comment on past results explains that a statement
that, for example, "a lawyer has obtained acquittals in all charges in 4
criminal defense cases" is objectively verifiable and therefore
permissible if true.78 By contrast, "general statements such as 'I have
successfully represented clients' or 'I have won numerous appellate
cases' may or may not be sufficiently objectively verifiable" because
the average prospective client may understand "successful" and "won"
in absolute terms whereas an attorney may understand them in more
nuanced terms.79 Such statements thus may mislead the average
prospective client to unjustifiably expecting similar results from a
previous case.8 0 Likewise, the comment on characterization of skills,
experience, reputation, or record explains that the statement "our firm is
the largest firm in this city that practices exclusively personal injury
law" is objectively verifiable and thus permissible if true.8 But
descriptive statements such as "the best," "second to none," or "the
finest" are not objectively verifiable and consequently are prohibited
because they are "likely" to mislead prospective clients as to the quality
of an attorney's services. 82 The rule also has the effect of prohibiting
client testimonials about the quality of an attorney's legal abilities,
regardless of the client's legal insight or understanding to render such
an opinion. Thus, for example, a client could seemingly testify that an
attorney provided "prompt and courteous advice," but not that an
attorney "was prompt and courteous in providing cutting-edge legal
advice." 83
Since the Supreme Court rendered Bates, the extent to which a
governing body may restrict, as deceptive or misleading, "advertising
claims relating to the quality of legal services . . . not susceptible of
precise measurement or verification" 84 has remained a contentious
76. Id. R. 4.7.3(b)(3).
77. Id. R. 4.7.3(b)(8) cmt.






84. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977).
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issue. As the Fifth Circuit elaborated in Public Citizen, the Central
Hudson test-specifically, the prongs mandating the government "to
demonstrate that the challenged rules are narrowly drawn to materially
advance the asserted substantial interests"-allows regulators to
prohibit such claims but only if they show that the unverifiable
5985
statements are "likely to be misleading .... In Public Citizen, the
attorney regulatory board relied on survey data about the public's
opinion on client testimonials and truthfulness in the legal profession to
justify its ban on communications about past results. The court
dismissed the data, however, as "either too general to provide sufficient
support for the rule's prohibition or too specific to do so."87 According
to the court, the more general data about the poor perception of
attorneys and attorney advertisements "fail[ed] to point to any specific
harms or to how they will be alleviated by a ban on testimonials or
references to past results."88 And the more specific data about
testimonials failed to "shed light on the rule's prohibition of only those
testimonials specifically discussing the attorney's past results . . . ."89
The Fifth Circuit's analysis is consistent with the district court's
analysis in Harrell. There, in defending against a challenge to the
current Florida Bar rule restricting qualitative statements in attorney
advertisements as applied to a slogan in a television commercial, the
Bar put forward "data which purportedly show[ed] that television
advertising 'lowers the public's respect for the fairness and integrity of
the legal system and adversely affects the system."'9 0 The court,
however, was not persuaded by the Bar's characterization of the data. 9 1
In any event, the court reasoned, "evidence that the public dislikes
85. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att'y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 220, 222 (5th Cir.
2011) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
86. Id. at 220-22.
87. Id. at 222.
88. Id. (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771).
89. Id. The survey results indicated that "83% of the interviewed public did not agree
'client testimonials in lawyer advertisements are completely truthful."' Id The court noted that
the results
might be read to show that a majority of the Louisiana public may be unswayed
by testimonials-perhaps demonstrating that they are a poor advertising
choice-but not that banning only those testimonials that relate to past results
will "ensur[e] the accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace" or is
required to uphold ethical standards in the profession.
Id. (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771).
90. Harrell v. Fla. Bar, No. 3:08-cv-15-J-34TEM, slip op. at 35 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30,
2011), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/dbr/Harrell-vFloridaBar DistrictCourt Or
der 00311 .pdf.
91. Id. at 39.
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television advertising generally does little to inform the Court as to any
harms potentially caused by Harrell's slogan specifically."92
Public Citizen and Harrell beg whether the Bar has met its burden of
showing why objectively unverifiable references to past results,
comparisons, and certain characterizations (which may be in the form of
a testimonial) are "deceptive and inherently misleading," and
susceptible to prohibition in the proposed rules. Like the Louisiana Bar,
the Florida Bar conducted a survey of Floridians' attitude toward
attorney advertising, which it included in support of the proposed
rules.93 Although the survey appears to have ambitiously polled the
public on many aspects of attorney advertising, the results may offer
only limited support for restricting speech not subject to objective
verification. For example, about 22% of the respondents thought that
advertisements for professional services are misleading; on the other
hand, the same percentage thought that such advertisements are
accurate. 94 Additionally, more than half of the respondents indicated
that their view of the Florida court system did not change after seeing
attorney advertising on television and the Internet, while about a quarter
of the respondents said that the advertisements negatively affected their
view, and about 10% reported an improved view of the system.95 The
vast majority, however, did not rate advertisements as one of the most
important factors in deciding upon whom to retain as counsel.96 By
contrast, 61% rated client endorsements as an important attribute to
consider when hiring an attorney. 97 A plaintiff challenging the proposed
rules, in sum, may assert that the survey results are inconclusive and
thus fail to show a real harm to the public, as is required to restrict
commercial speech.98
Even if the Bar could meet its legal burden with the survey data, it
remains to be seen whether the proposed rules' proscription of
unsubstantiated, qualitative statements are truly "clear and
simple . . . ."99 The proposed ban on characterizations of an attorney's
skills, experience, reputation, or record, for example, explains that
"[s]tatements of a character trait or attribute," "[d]escriptive statements
that are true and factually verified," and "[a]spirational statements" are
permissible; yet descriptive statements that "cannot be objectively
verified" and descriptive statements that are misleading are
92. Id. at 35.
93. See generally Advertising Report, supra note 69.
94. Id. at 12
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Id.
98. Cf Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att'y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2011).
99. Advertising Report, supra note 69, at 4.
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impermissible. 00 Thus, based on the illustrations in the rule, it seems
that an attorney could advertise that "I have obtained acquittals in all ten
criminal cases that I have taken" and that "My legal philosophy is
guided by careful reasoning and aggressive advocacy," but not that "I
have obtained acquittals in all ten criminal cases that I have taken
because of my careful reasoning and aggressive advocacy."1ot
As these illustrations suggest, enforcement of the proposed rules
may turn on semantic splicing, "similar to the way rule 4-7.2, the
current rule against qualitative characterizations, has been enforced." In
holding in Harrell that the plaintiffs could proceed to challenge this rule
as unconstitutionally vague, the Eleventh Circuit noted the Bar's
apparently inconsistent determinations that the phrases "When who you
choose matters most" and "MAKE THE RIGHT CHOICE!"
characterized the quality of legal services, but that the phrase "Choosing
the right person to guide you through the criminal justice system may be
your most important decision. Choose wisely" did not.'0  Though the
district court later held that this rule was not "unconstitutionally vague
because it lacks enforcement standards resulting in the Bar's broad
interpretation . . . and arbitrary enforcement," the court acknowledged
that "the Bar's application . . . to [various] carefully worded
advertisements often appears to turn on fine, and at times almost
imperceptible, distinctions." 0 3 Indeed, in Harrell itself, the Bar initially
concluded that the attorney's television slogan "Don't settle for less
than you deserve" was a qualitative characterization but later reversed
course during litigation-a change of position that was insufficient to
deter the district court from holding that the Bar's initial application
violated the attorney's First Amendment rights.104 To this end, the court
rejected the Bar's claim that the proposed rules-pursuant to which the
Bar argued the slogan would be permissible-mooted the challenge:
"[T]he submission of the Revised Rules to the Florida Supreme Court
[does not] make[] it 'absolutely clear' that the Bar will not change its
position with respect to the slogan." 0 5
Despite implying that the proposed rules governing qualitative
statements would at least survive vagueness attack, Harrell does
indicate that one other proposed rule, rule 4-7.5, may be
100. Pending Adver. Rules, supra note 70, R. 4-7.3 cmt.
101. See id.
102. Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010).
103. Harrell v. Fla. Bar, No. 3:08-cv-15-J-34TEM, slip op. at 16, 18 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30,
2011), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/dbr/Harrell-v_FloridaBar DistrictCourt
Orderl0031 1.pdf.
104. See id. at 36 n.23.
105. Id.
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unconstitutionally vague and chill protected speech.106 That rule bans
"unduly manipulative or intrusive advertisements," such as the use of
"an image, sound, video or dramatization in a manner that is designed to
solicit legal employment by appealing to a prospective client's emotions
rather than to a rational evaluation of a lawyer's suitability to represent
the prospective client." 0 7 The rule is similar to the prohibitions of
manipulative radio or television advertisements in current rules 4-7.2
and 4-7.5, which the Harrell district court concluded are impermissibly
vague.s0 8 As the court reasoned, "almost every television advertisement
employs visual images or depictions that are designed to influence, and
thereby 'manipulate,' the viewer into following a particular course of
action, in the most unexceptional sense." 09 Advertising, in other words,
by definition aims to "manipulate" or "intrude" a consumer's decision-
making; it thus seems implausible that such manipulation or intrusion
could be "undue," at least in any way that attorneys could discern and
regulators could measure. Therefore, Harrell suggests the proposed rule
may not withstand a vagueness attack.' 10
Insofar as the "undue manipulation" rule further would restrict the
kind of advertising techniques at issue before the Second Circuit in
Alexander-"wisps of smoke, blue electrical currents, and special
effects"' "-the rule also may constrain attorneys' First Amendment
commercial speech rights. As the court explained there, Central Hudson
demands that regulators put forward more than "an interest in keeping
attorney advertising factual and relevant" to limit advertising they may
find tasteless, and show through convincing evidence that such
advertising actually misleads the public.1 2 But, the court opined,
meeting the latter requirement may be impossible in an era in which
advertisements that push the envelope are the norm and may have the
most communicative impact on the public.' 1 3
In sum, the proposed rules mark an ambitious attempt to regulate, in
a constitutional manner, the continually changing means that attorneys
use to advertise to the public. To the Bar's credit, the rules are an
improvement over the comparatively rigid rules that are still in effect as
of this writing, especially when juxtaposed with recent case law.
Nevertheless, the foregoing points show that the proposed rules are not
foolproof to constitutional challenge. If the Florida Supreme Court
106. Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1257.
107. Pending Adver. Rules, supra note 70, R. 4-7.5(a).
108. See Harrell, slip op. at 20-22.
109. Id. at 20 (quoting Harrell, 608 F.3d at 1255).
110. See generally Harrel, slip op. at 35.
111. Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 2010).
112. Id. at 93.
113. Id. at 94.
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adopts the rules as they are, the history of attorney advertising in Florida
indicates that such a challenge is likely, if not inevitable.
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The Florida Bar has built its reputation as an aggressive regulator of
attorney advertising, particularly as it has evolved with new technology.
Even with its less restrictive proposed advertising rules, the Bar
endeavors to regulate, in great detail, advertising that it determined
corrodes the public interest and the veracity of the legal system. Given
the scope of this regulatory regime, attorneys are bound to test its
constitutionality if the Florida Supreme Court enacts it.
The Bar's proposed rules are not the only template for regulating
attorney advertising. The American Bar Association's latest policy
position offers an alternative, suggesting that a "less is more" approach
is better. In revealing proposals governing attorney "use of technology-
based client development tools," the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20
recently declined to amend or qualify the basic prohibition of false and
misleading communications that is cross-referenced in ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2.114 "Though the Model Rules were
written before these technologies had been invented," explained
Commission Co-Chair Jamie Gorelick, "their prohibition of false and
misleading communications apply just as well to online advertising and
other forms of electronic communications that are used to attract new
clients today."" 5 The Commission proposed changes only to the
comment to rule 7.2, which distinguishes the ABA's policy from more
restrictive policies:
Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against
television and other forms of advertising, against advertising
going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against
"undignified" advertising. Television, the Internet, and other
forms of electronic communication are now among the most
powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly
persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television,
Internet, and other forms of electronic advertising, therefore,
would impede the flow of information about legal services to
many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be
114. See Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Recommends No New
Restrictions on Lawyer Adver. (June 29, 2011), http://www.abanow.org/2011/06/aba-conmiss
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advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can
accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would
regard as relevant.116
Whichever approach a jurisdiction adopts, the decision-making
process that it employs should be guided centrally by the constitutional
principles that set the outer bounds of regulatory authority. Although the
recent opinions of the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits reaffirm the
validity of the state's interests in protecting the public and the
trustworthiness of the legal system by regulating deceptive and
misleading advertising, the opinions also highlight the constitutionally
slippery slope that emerges when regulations contain restrictions for
which there is inadequate evidence of a nexus to harm. Additionally,
when these restrictions are subject to inconsistent, subjective
interpretation, a void-for-vagueness challenge may arise.
Though the innovations of the day may warrant regulators to
exercise the power with which they have been publically entrusted,
these principles should not be lost in the bureaucratic fray, as they have
been in Florida as regulators delegated tasks to advisory bodies whose
policy prescriptions at times clashed. Constitutionally dubious rules
create uncertainty for the practicing bar and the public that depends
upon its services, and expose regulatory responses to criticisms of
overreaction and shortsightedness. In sum, a bar association fares better
if it ensures from the onset that its rules are constitutional and possess
the flexibility to remain so in the face of evolving technology-
considerations that reduce the risk of returning to the drawing board to
wonder, "Now what do I do?"
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 cmt. 3 (initial draft proposal 2011).
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